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Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs:
Invasion of the Castle Common
Armand Arabian*
I. INTRODUCTION
The American dream of owning a home usually brings with it the
assurance of a peaceful retreat from the demands of the outer world,
including its constraints on many lifestyle choices. For those who pur-
chase a condominium or similar residence in a planned development
community, however, the expectation of protective insulation is often
not realized. Such individuals are subject to the covenants, conditions,
and restrictions (CC&Rs) contained in the development's declaration or
in the bylaws of its homeowners association (HOA). These restrictions
not only impose limitations on conduct in common and publicly visible
areas but they also often dictate basic aspects of a resident's mode of
living within the privacy of his or her own unit.
A development's rules and regulations are commonly enforced by the
association's board of directors, which holds substantial sway over the
financial and property interests of residents. Many owners may be com-
pletely unaware of such a possibility when purchasing their units. Only
after they have moved in and settled down do they discover that the
development declaration contains a host of intrusive restrictions affect-
ing their daily lives, including, quite possibly, the prohibition of house-
hold animals. Even when pets are confined entirely to an owner's unit
and do not impair the quiet enjoyment of others, the board, on behalf
of the association, can institute enforcement proceedings and impose
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substantial fines pending capitulation. In most states, the legal system
will uphold such actions in all but the most egregious of circumstances.
In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,' I took
exception to the California Supreme Court's determination that a virtual
ban on pets was not unreasonable and could be enforced against the
owner of three cats when the animals remained inside her unit at all
times, did not make noise or generate odor, and did not create a nui-
sance for other residents. Although the authority aggressively wielded
by development associations was not at issue in the case, I became
convinced that the authority-unrestrained by basic principles of due
process or even rationality-threatens fundamental interests heretofore
assumed as sacrosanct incidents of home ownership. Given the growing
popularity of multi-unit developments and the presumption of reason-
ableness the law accords recorded restrictions, vast numbers of people
are vulnerable to significant limitations on their conduct enforced by
their neighbors without accountability or independent review.
In this article, I extrapolate from my dissent in Nahrstedt and discuss
some of the critical concerns implicated in its holding. I also proffer
model legislation designed to protect individual property owners from
the specter of unbridled majoritarian domination and to restore a mea-
sure of balance in the enforcement, of CC&Rs applicable to condomin-
iums and other planned community developments. Such a curative ef-
fort may promote harmonious communal living, prevent judicial en-
meshment into this emotionally charged area of law, and instigate a
national scholarly and legislative debate on the subject.
II. NAHRSTEDT V. LAKESIDE VILLAGE CONDOMINIUM ASS'N INC.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In January 1988, Natore Nahrstedt purchased a condominium in
Lakeside Village, a large development in Culver City, in Los Angeles.2
Lakeside Village consists of 530 units in twelve separate three-story
buildings.' Residents share many common facilities including lobbies,
hallways, laundry, and trash services.'
As with most common interest communities, ownership interests in
Lakeside Village are subject to certain CC&Rs set forth in the
developer's declaration.5 Upon purchasing a unit, each owner automati-
1. 878 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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cally becomes a member of the development's homeowners association,
the Lakeside Village Association, which enforces the CC&Rs as well as
other regulations contained in the bylaws.' Lakeside Village maintains a
pet restriction that provides in relevant part: "No animals (which shall
mean dogs and cats), livestock, reptiles or poultry shall be kept in any
unit."7 When Nahrstedt moved into her condominium, she brought
along her three cats, which she had owned for many years and which
she considered to be her family.8 After learning of the cats' presence,
the Association demanded Nahrstedt remove them and imposed a fine
for each month she remained in violation of the prohibition, for a total
in excess of $6,000.6
Nahrstedt denied any prior knowledge of the pet restriction and initi-
ated a lawsuit against the Association for damages and injunctive re-
lief.'0 She contended the restriction was unreasonable as applied be-
cause the cats did not penetrate the common areas or otherwise create
a nuisance for others." The Association demurred, maintaining the pet
restriction was enforceable because it furthered the "collective health,
happiness and peace of mind" of those living in the development. 2 The
trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action on that
basis. 3 The court of appeal reversed, concluding the test of reason-
ableness depended on the facts of each case. In the majority's view, the
pet restriction was not reasonable when measured against the allega-
tions in Nahrstedt's complaint.' The dissenting justice criticized this
6. Id.
7. Id. The CC&Rs permit residents to keep domestic fish and birds. Id. at 1278
n.3.
8. See id. at 1278-79.
9. Id.
10. Id. Nahrstedt also filed suit against the Association's officers and two of its
employees. Id. The original suit sought invalidation of the assessments, an inunction
against future fines, and damages for violation of her privacy. Id. at 1279.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Consistent with other appellate decisions, the majority interpreted California
Civil Code § 1354 as imposing the following standard of reasonableness: "Reasonable
and enforceable restrictions are those which prohibit conduct which, while otherwise
lawful, in fact interferes with, or has a reasonable likelihood of interfering with, the
rights of other condominium owners to the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of their
property." CAL CrV. CODE § 1354 (West Supp. 1995); see Portola Hills Community
Ass'n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that reasonableness is a
question of law); Bernardo Villas Management Corp. v. Black, 235 Cal. Rptr. 509, 510
case-by-case assessment, arguing it conflicted with the California
Legislature's intent to make CC&Rs presumptively enforceable. 5 The
California Supreme Court granted review to decide upon what basis a
condominium owner can prevent enforcement of a recorded restric-
tion.
6
B. California Supreme Court Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court's majority7 categorically rejected the
court of appeal's "as applied" approach and held that under the provi-
sions of Civil Code section 1354, CC&Rs are presumptively valid and
not subject to challenge on the basis of individual considerations."
Citing the recent dramatic increase in the number of condominiums, co-
operatives, and planned unit developments with HOAs,"9 the majority
noted that common interest developments (CIDs) have become a widely
(Ct. App. 1987) (stating that "restrictions become equitable servitudes unless unrea-
sonable"). California Civil Code § 1354(a) provides:
The covenants and restrictions in the declaration [of a common interest de-
velopment] shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and
shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the
development. Unless the declaration states otherwise, these servitudes may be
enforced by any owner of a separate interest or by the association, or by
both.
CAL Crv. CODE § 1354(a) (West Supp. 1995).
15. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279; see Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
Ass'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299, 312-15 (Ct. App. 1992) (Hinz, J., dissenting), rev'd, 878
P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
16. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279.
17. Justice Kennard authored the opinion in which the remainder of the court,
except me, concurred. Id. at 1275.
18. Id. This validity assumes, of course, compliance with any applicable procedural
requirements such as proper recordation. See, e.g., CAL CiV. CODE § 1353 (West
Supp. 1995).
19. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279. After 1960, land and construction prices increased
markedly, leading to the heightened interest in common interest housing. STEPHEN E.
BARTON & CAROL J. SILVERMAN, HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE COMMON-INTEREST DEVELOPMENT
3-8 (Inst. of Urban and Regional Dev. Working Paper No. 469, 1987). In addition,
Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1961, encouraging and facilitating con-
dominium ownership by making federal mortgage insurance available for their pur-
chase. 15A Am. JUR. 2D Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments § 7 (1976). Re-
gardless of form, all utilize some type of homeowners association, also referred to as
residential community associations, to govern and manage their affairs. Robert B.
Hawkins, Jr., Preface to RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
IN TE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? at i (Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1989). In 1992, there were an estimated 150,000 homeowners associations
in the United States managing 11.6 million individual units, mostly located in Califor-
nia and Florida. Karen E. Klein, Living on Common Ground, Condominium Associa-
tion: The New Neighborhood, LA. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, at K1 (pt. 1).
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accepted form of real property ownership." Owners enoy many advan-
tages associated with having their own residence while also acquiring
"an interest in the amenities and facilities included in the project."2'
This dual aspect of ownership accounts in large measure for their popu-
larity.
22
The creation of many severable interests in one property develop-
ment requires the preparation of a declaration setting forth the CC&Rs
that will eventually govern residents and that may limit and control
their use of both the common and individually owned areas.' This
20. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279. Common interest developments are the fastest
growing form of housing in the nation, with one of every eight Americans now living
in this type of residence. Karen E. Klein, Code Blues: Rules That Govern Life in
Homeoumers Associations Are Being Challenged in Court by Angry Oumers, LA.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at KI (pt. 2) (citing a study by the Community Associations
Institute). As of 1988, approximately 29 million people live in some form of CID,
including condominiums, cooperatives, and planned unit developments. This wide
acceptance has been labeled the "community association phenomenon." C. James
Dowden, Community Associations and Local Governments: The Need for Recognition
and Reassessment in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 27, 27 (Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions, 1989).
21. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279. In California, for example, CIDs provide a variety
of facilities and services not otherwise available or affordable to the average
single-family home owner, including lawn care and gardening, parks and playgrounds,
meeting places, garbage collection, parking lots or structures, swimming facilities,
water and sewer lines, and entry guards and security patrols. Stephen E. Barton &
Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common Interest Community, in
COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 4-6
(Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994). Since CIDs may be able to
provide better delivery of local services as well as offer improved efficiency of met-
ropolitan land use and neighborhood conditions, unit owners may enjoy not only
higher property values but also a better quality of life. Robert H. Nelson, The Privat-
ization of Local Government: From Zoning to RCAs, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY As-
SOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 45, 50 (Advisory
Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, 1989). At the same time, however, develop-
ers may use amenities to target certain economic or other specific groups for a par-
ticular project, leading to or exacerbating neighborhood segregation. Id.
22. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1279.
23. Id. at 1281. The document typically describes the property, specifies which ar-
eas are commonly or individually owned, and enumerates the restrictions applicable
to use of the common areas and facilities. Id. Among other items, restrictions most
often relate to architectural design and fencing, use of structures, use of common
property, subdivision of lots, limitation on persons who may occupy a single unit,
and restriction or prohibition of household pets. Clayton P. Gillette, Mediating Insti-
tutions: Beyond the PublicdPrivate Distinction-Courts, Covenants, and Communities,
document is recorded prior to the sale of any individual unit. Because
the intended purpose of CC&Rs is to promote the health and happiness
of the majority of unit owners,' they are "an inherent part of any com-
mon interest development and are crucial to the stable, planned envi-
ronment of any shared ownership arrangement. "" Mandatory member-
ship in a HOA is typically incident to common interest property owner-
ship.6 Acting on the association's behalf, an elected board of directors
enforces property use restrictions and other regulations. Because their
function allows these boards to exercise considerable control over
many aspects of everyday life, they "must guard against the potential
for the abuse of that power."" Nevertheless, in the majority's view,
anyone purchasing a unit in a CID with knowledge of the HOA's en-
forcement authority accepts the possibility it may be exercised for the
purported benefit of the community, even if it is to the detriment of the
individual.' In addition to affordability, this mutual enforceability of
61 U. CI. L REv. 1375, 1384-85 (1994). For an example of a declaration of CC&Rs
for a CID development, see generally Gurdon H. Buck, Drfting Documents for Con-
dominiums, PUDs, and Golf Course Communities, C924 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 117, 133-83
(1994) (including an exhibit by Wayne S. Hyatt, Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,
and Restrictions for Pleasant View).
24. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1282.
25. Id. at 1275.
26. Id.; see CuRnIs C. SPRouL & KATHARINE N. ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS § 2.20 (1991). Characteristics of all com-
munity associations include mandatory membership of owners, consent to authority
for enforcement of restrictions governing the use of property, and maintenance of the
property. See EvAN MCKEN ZE, PRIVATOPIA, 126-49 (1994). In mandatory HOAs, board
members generally are responsible for enforcing rules relating to maintenance of the
common property and financing the community's activities through property owner
assessments. Barton & Silverman, supra note 21, at 31; see also WARREN FREEDMAN &
JONATHAN B. ALTER, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIA AND PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS,
21-38, 109-26 (1992) (discussing the nature of property owners associations and the
regulations governing them).
27. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1281-82. Some commentators have noted these governing
boards tend to become places "'where people who like control can go and have a
sense of control.'" Mike Bowler & Evan McKenzie, Invisible Kingdoms, CAL LAw.,
Dec. 1985, at 56 (quoting homeowner association lawyer Thomas E. Miller). "'These
are mini-governments which in some respects have more power than. govern-
ments . . . .'" Id. at 55 (quoting author Richard Louv); see McKENZIE, supra note 26,
at 122 ("[H]omeowner associations have full legal rights, limited responsibility for the
individuals who operate them, a potentially infinite lifespan, and a dedication to ...
protection of property values. In carrying out this purpose, homeowner associations
function as private governments.").
28. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1282. Although purchasers receive constructive notice by
virtue of recordation, in many instances they may be unaware of the breadth of dis-
cretionary power exercised by the HOA because of the boilerplate language the dec-
larations typically utilize. See Barton & Silverman, supra note 21. See generally Carl
B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a
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CC&Rs against future as well as current homeowners is a primary ad-
vantage of common interest property ownership and accounts for the
recent increase in popularity of CIDs.
The majority next turned to California's governing law, the Davis-
Stirling Common Interest Development Act (the Act), which addresses
various aspects of CIDs, including CC&Rs.' Pursuant to the Act, "[tihe
covenants and restrictions in the declaration [of a CID] shall be en-
forceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable."3 Under the
majority's interpretation, this language manifests a legislative intent in
favor of enforceability, according recorded use restrictions the same
effect as equitable servitudes by making them binding against current
and subsequent purchasers without actual notice. 2 Such deference to
broad applicability reinforces and enhances stability and predictability
in CIDs since it both conforms to owners' expectations as to the use of
their property and protects them from unexpected fee increases.' In
construing Civil Code section 1354, the majority placed the burden on
the individual to establish unreasonableness and declined to permit
challenges on a case-by-case basis; only the validity of a particular re-
striction in the abstract is subject to attack.' This interpretation avoids
the financial drain on HOA resources and other disadvantages that
might arise from frequent litigation over the enforceability of CC&Rs.'
Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837 (1995) (discussing restrictions of
property owner associations and recommending that courts evaluate restrictions and
uphold those that are nonintrusive and voluntary).
29. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1282.
30. Id. at 1284; see CAL Civ. CODE §§ 1350-1374 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). The
Act was passed in 1985. Common interest developments are composed of community
apartment projects, condominium projects, planned developments, and stock coopera-
tives. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1284 n.7.
31. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1284-85 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(a) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1995)). Restrictions enforceable under this provision must meet the require-
ments of equitable servitudes or covenants running with the land. Id. at 1283. If they
do not, enforceability depends upon actual notice. Id. Not all states apply the same
standard; some enforce restrictions regardless of actual or constructive notice as long
as they are "reasonable," meaning that they "further[] the collective 'health, happiness
and enjoyment of life' of owners of a common interest development" Id. at 1279
(quoting the Association's Points and Authorities in support of its demurrer to the
complaint).
32. Id. at 1285. Inclusion of restrictions in a declaration recorded with the county
recorder provides sufficient notice to bind subsequent purchasers. Id.
33. Id. at 1286-87.
34. Id. at 1289.
35. Id. at 1288-89.
The court did acknowledge, however, that covenants violating public
policy or causing harm disproportionate to their benefit are unreason-
able within the meaning of the statute.'
Applying these principles to Nahrstedt's claims, the majority criticized
the court of appeal's reliance on Bernardo Villas Management Corp.
Number Two v. Black37 and Portola Hills Community Ass'n v.
James,' rejecting the case-by-case reasonableness inquiry as inconsis-
tent with the language and intent of Civil Code section 1354.' The
standard for determining reasonableness should be made "not by refer-
ence to facts that are specific to the objecting homeowner, but by refer-
ence to the common interest development as a whole,"" and use re-
strictions should be applied uniformly against all residents. Thus,
"courts must enforce the restriction unless the challenger can show that
the restriction is unreasonable because it is arbitrary, violates a funda-
mental public policy, or imposes burdens on the use of the affected
property that substantially outweigh the restriction's benefits."4' In
view of the competing interests involved, the majority considered this
approach essential to the success of CIDs.42
Applying the standard to the Lakeside Village prohibition of house-
hold animals, the court denied Nahrstedt relief because "[als a matter
of law,... the recorded pet restriction.., is not arbitrary, but is ratio-
nally related to health, sanitation and noise concerns legitimately held
by residents."' The court noted the pet restriction may have attracted
36. Id. at 1286. Examples include restrictions based on race, religion, color, ances-
try, national origin, or disability. Id. In addition, if a restriction bears "no rational
relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the affected
land," it is unenforceable. Id. at 1286-87 (citing Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v.
Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 142 (Ct. App. 1981)).
37. 235 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1987); see supra note 14 and accompanying text
38. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1992); see supra note 14 and accompanying text
39. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290. In Bernardo Vilas, the HOA maintained a re-
striction against "keeping any 'truck, camper, trailer, boat .. .or other form of recre-
ational vehicle' in the carports." Id. at 1289 (quoting Bernardo Villas, 235 Cal. Rptr.
at 509). The subject restriction in Portola Hills banned satellite dishes. Id. In each
case, the court of appeal found enforcement efforts unreasonable as applied because
the homeowner's conduct, even though contrary to the CC&Rs, did not impair the
enjoyment of others in the use of their property. Id. at 1289-90. According to the
Nahrstedt majority, this analysis failed to apply the relevant principles of equitable
servitudes. Id. at 1290.
40. Id. at 1289-90.
41. Id. at 1289-92.
42. Id. at 1291.
43. Id. at 1290. In addition, the court noted Nahrstedt's complaint did not allege
any facts showing that the burden of the restriction outweighed its benefits. Id. at
1291. Finally, the restriction did not violate public policy because no state or federal
provision confers a right to keep household pets in condominiums. Id. at 1290-91.
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many purchasers to the community." Moreover, since residents could
change the restriction, their inaction manifested a desire to maintain its
enforcement.'
C. The Dissent
Although I did not quarrel with the majority's construction of Civil
Code section 1354 in the abstract, I took exception to its conclusions as
to the enforceability of the Lakeside Village pet restriction, which I
found patently arbitrary and unreasonable. The analysis failed to con-
sider the integral role household animals have come to play in the lives
of human beings regardless of age, economic status, or any other dis-
tinguishing factor. In imposing a total prohibition even for pets like
Nahrstedt's that created no nuisance for other residents, the CC&Rs
substantially burdened those many individuals deprived of their valued
companionship without a corresponding benefit to the community as a
whole. Liberally construing the pleadings "with a view to substantial
justice between the parties,"" the complaint sufficiently alleged the
unreasonableness of the pet restriction to allow the action to go for-
ward.
47
As partially chronicled in my dissent, the relationship between human
beings and their pets is a long, well-established tradition of companion-
ship and service. Both young and old benefit from their friendship and
loyalty, which may help overcome many hours of loneliness. Children
learn responsibility and discipline by taking care of a pet and adults
receive a sense of security.' Service dogs assist the blind, deaf, and
Yet, California Health and Safety Code § 19901 does permit disabled and elderly indi-
viduals to possess household pets and precludes landlords from refusing to rent to
them on that basis. Id at 1291 n.12; see CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19901 (West
1992).
44. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1292 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1293 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (citing CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 452) (West
1973 & Supp. 1995).
47. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting). In her complaint, Nahrstedt alleged she never re-
leased her cats from the confines of her unit; furthermore, they made no noise, did
not generate any odors, and did not create any other type of nuisance. Id. (Arabian,
J., dissenting). For purposes of reviewing the ruling on the Association's demurrer,
the court was bound to accept these averments as true. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting)
(citing Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura, 282 Cal. Rptr. 877, 881-82 (CL
App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992)).
48. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1295 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
disabled in living fuller, more productive lives. Pets also provide impor-
tant therapeutic benefit for those who suffer from serious disease or
are confined to their home."9 While pet ownership may not be a funda-
mental right, its importance to the daily well-being and enjoyment of
many people is undeniable.' In my view, the majority's failure to con-
sider the significant and substantial role household animals play in the
larger context of human affairs fatally undermined the conclusion that
the restriction did not impose an undue burden imposed on some con-
dominium owners while providing a minimal benefit to the community
at large.5 It appeared obvious that prohibiting animals cannot in any
respect foster the "health, happiness [or] peace of mind" of others who
do not see, hear or smell them. I found this absence of a nexus be-
tween burden and benefit to be the essence of unreasonableness under
Civil Code section 1354, as construed by the majority.'
Moreover, the pet restriction itself, with an exception for domestic
birds and fish, was inherently inconsistent and even contradictory as to
the Association's proffered justification.' Birds are capable of making
noises resulting in the kind of disturbance the restriction presumably is
intended to prevent.' Bird droppings may create a health hazard when
placed in common trash areas.' Similarly, maintenance of fish may
lead to problems, such as tank leakage, that cause damage both to
other units and the common areas.57 Thus, when applied to Nahrstedt's
ownership of three household cats, the rationale that the pet restriction
must be enforced for "the health, sanitation and noise concerns of oth-
er unit owners" cannot be reconciled with the express exceptions the
majority impliedly recognized as permissible under Lakeside Village's
CC&Rs.
Witnessing the majority cloak essentially all CC&Rs in a presumption
of validity and concomitantly accord virtual sovereignty to the HOAs
that enforce them, I realized the individual unit owner in any CID in
this state had little, if any, control over many intimate aspects of per-
49. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting). In contrast, some animals prohibited by the restric-
tion are actually incapable of maldng any sound whatsoever, including hamsters, tur-
tles, and small reptiles. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting). Like other household animals, birds are also capa-
ble of carrying disease and aggravating allergies in humans. Id. (Arabian, J., dissent-
ing).
57. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1295-96 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
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sonal lifestyles most homeowners take for granted. Not only is virtually
every development declaration created by a business enterprise that
may have no residential interest in the property and primarily seeks to
maximize its financial return, but actual notice is irrelevant to enforce-
ability. In my estimation, the reasoning and result in Nahrstedt illustrat-
ed a matter of increasing concern both for those who choose and those
who have no choice but to purchase their residential property in a CID.
Their individual rights and interests may be sharply curtailed by CC&Rs
they have little ability to modify. At the same time, they may find them-
selves at the mercy of their HOAs, which have the authority pursuant to
the majority's construction of Civil Code section 1354 articulated in
Nahrstedt to intrude into many everyday activities in the guise of en-
forcing CC&Rs, with little accountability, much less due process. This
realization prompted my research into possible means for striking a
balance between the governing power accorded these HOAs and the
individual freedoms of their members.'
II. STANDARDS OF ENFORCEABILITY
Most courts assessing the enforceability of CC&Rs found in CID dec-
larations have adopted a standard of reasonableness.' While often for-
mulated in similar terms, application of the test can differ depending in
part on whether the source is statutory or judicial. Alternatively, some
courts utilize a corporate analogy, applying the business judgment rule
to HOA enforcement actions, either exclusively or in conjunction with a
variant of the reasonableness standard. Regardless of the test used,
however, the decisions most commonly uphold the restriction against
the individual owner.
A. The Reasonableness Standard
As noted, review under the reasonableness standard follows either
statutory mandate or decisional authority." Depending upon its origins,
the test may vary in three respects: (1) how the court defines reason-
59. Id. at 1296-97 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
60. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
61. Unless formulating a hybrid test, courts implementing a reasonableness stan-
dard generally have not considered the business judgment rule as a possible alterna-
tive measure of judicial review. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see
text accompanying infra notes 86-110.
ableness; (2) which party has the burden of proof on the issue; and (3)
whether any presumption of validity prevails.
The Florida District Court of Appeal, lacking legislative guidelines,
was one of the first to adopt a reasonableness standard in the landmark
case of Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman.' The challenged
restriction prohibited alcohol in the common areas.' In upholding the
HOA enforcement action, the court formulated the following test: "[Tihe
association is not at liberty to adopt arbitrary or capricious rules bear-
ing no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the
various unit owners."' Nonetheless,
inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote the health,
happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of unit owners since they are living
in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give
up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might otherwise enjoy in sepa-
rate, privately owned property."
Although the opinion did not expressly allocate the burden of proof, the
analysis implied the HOA must assume responsibility for establishing the
reasonableness of a particular restriction.' The court noted the applica-
tion of this test implicated a case-specific inquiry and lacked a uniform
standard for determining the validity of HOA decisions.67 Despite these
potential disadvantages, many other states have adopted a similar ap-
proach, usually by judicial imposition.'
62. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
63. Id. at 181.
64. Id. at 182.
65. Id. at 181-82.
66. See id. at 182.
67. Id
68. For instance, in Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct App. 1978), the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals upheld as reasonable the HOA's installation of locks on all
doors to the common areas because the HOA balanced the respective interests of the
individual condominium owner and the community as a whole. Id. at 198. Based on
reports of vandalism, the concern for protecting the community reasonably out-
weighed any slight inconvenience to individual homeowners, particularly since individ-
uals when purchasing property in a CID commonly relinquish some traditional proper-
ty rights to the HOA's board. Id.
Moreover, in Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977), the court upheld a restriction prohibiting homeowners from
parking any vehicle overnight on driveways leading to their garages. Id. at 636. The
court's rationale included a variety of considerations: the limitations inherent in CID
property ownership, the stated purpose contained in the declaration authorizing the
board to act, and the board's determination that "aspects of aesthetics, safety, securi-
ty, and convenience" necessitated the regulation. Id.
In Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1980), the court applied the same reasonableness test in determining the HOA
board acted within its authority when it passed a prospective regulation restricting
unit owners to only one pet. Id. at 1235. The court found this result consistent with
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Subsequently, in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v: Basso,' the same
court articulated a distinction in applying the reasonableness test."0 The
court identified two categories of regulations: those in place before an
association was formed-usually the CC&Rs contained in the CIDs dec-
laration-and those later adopted by the HOA's Board of Directors.7
Restrictions in the first category are often compared to a covenant run-
ning with the land because the buyer is put on notice of the restrictions
at the time of purchase."2 They are presumed valid unless wholly arbi-
trary in application, violative of public policy, or incompatible with a fui-
damental constitutional right.' The main policy reason for this virtually
categorical enforcement is to protect the reliance interests of those pur-
chasing their property, who expect the HOA will maintain the recorded
CC&Rs consistent with the common scheme. ' Under this rationale, es-
sentially any restriction will pass muster, even, as the court recognized,
ones that "have a certain degree of unreasonableness"" and thus may
substantially impinge on the personal lifestyle of individual owners with-
in the confines of their own units.
76
the deferential approach usually taken with respect to restrictions pertaining to
household animals. Id, at 1235-36.
69. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
70. Id. at 639.
71. Id. at 639; see also Kress, supra note 28, at 837. The appellate court of Massa-
chusetts noted a similar distinction in applying the reasonableness test in Noble v.
Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). There, the court distinguished between
regulations appearing in the original documents such as covenants running with the
land, which are subject to more liberal review, and those put into effect by the
board of directors, which are subject to a more stringent reasonableness test. Id. at
270-71.
72. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
73. Id.
74. Id. Another underlying premise is that owners purchase their units with knowl-
edge of the existence of a written declaration and, as a matter of law, accept its
express restrictions. Id. at 639; see Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforce-
ability of Condominium Rules, 22 STMrsON L REV. 1133, 1151 (1993). In reality, how-
ever, it is questionable whether either real estate agents or purchasers are aware of
significant details contained in these often long and tedious documents. See Adriane
B. Miller, The Fine Print in Community Codes Can Deflate Dreams, BALTIMORE
MORNING SUN, Aug. 7, 1994, at 1K (describing a situation in which a Maryland buyer
who moved into a condominium with a dog and, like the plaintiff in Nahrstedt, only
later learned of a restriction prohibiting all pets).
75. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
76. In Nahrstedt, the majority construed California Civil Code § 1354 to accomplish
the same effect by according all CC&Rs a presumption of validity. 878 P.2d at 1275,
1292 (Cal. 1994) (en banc). Thus, a reviewing court need not-indeed cannot-assess
The second category, those promulgated by the board that become
part of the CID's bylaws, fall under the standard established in Hidden
Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman." Thus, an association board has the
power only to enact rules and regulations "reasonably related to the
promotion of the health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit own-
ers."7' Absent the presumption of validity, the board's decision-making
authority is more circumscribed to ensure the enacted rules benefit the
entire HOA.' Again, the court did not expressly allocate the burden of
demonstrating reasonableness; however, the tenor of its analysis quite
clearly, if impliedly, assigns to the individual unit owner in the case of
recorded CC&Rs and to the HOA's board of directors in other cases.8
In contrast to the foregoing decisions, the California Supreme Court in
Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc.81 formulated its
reasonableness standard in conformance with legislative mandate.' Ini-
tially, the court construed the statutory language to hold that CC&Rs
"should be enforced unless they are wholly arbitrary, violate a fundamen-
tal public policy, or impose a burden on the use of affected land that far
outweighs any benefit. "' The court then determined that a prior
amendment changing enforceability from "where reasonable" to "unless
unreasonable" created a presumption of validity, thereby shifting the
burden of proof to the person challenging the restriction. ' Finally, the
court adopted a standard of uniformity, expressly rejecting the
case-by-case approach of the lower courts.' Although Nahrstedt in-
the impact of a restriction on unit owners or question whether it actually protects
"health and happiness." Id. at 1296 (Arabian, J., dissenting). Under this analysis, it is
difficult to imagine a CC&R that "would not pass muster." Id. (Arabian, J., dissent-
ing).
77. 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("If a rule is reasonable the
association can adopt it, if not, it cannot.").
78. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 640.
79. In Basso, the court declined to allow enforcement of a regulation implemented
by the HOA board of directors prohibiting condominium owners from drilling wells,
which the board claimed might increase the salinity of ground water, stain the side-
walks, or influence other unit owners to build wells. Id. When the Bassos drilled a
well, which was contrary to the association board's directive, the latter filed suit for
injunctive relief. Id. Applying the reasonableness standard, the court ruled the board
had not met its burden of proving the restriction was reasonably related to the prof-
fered health and safety objectives. Id. at 640. The evidence at trial failed to show
that the Bassos' well caused any of the identified problems. Id.
80. Id, at 640.
81. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (en banc); see supra notes 2-59 and accompanying
text.
82. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1283-84; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1287.
84. Id. at 1286.
85. Id. at 1289-90.
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volved recorded CC&Rs, the sweep of the analysis impliedly embraces
bylaws and similar unrecorded regulations as well.
B. The Business Judgment Standard
New York has rejected the reasonableness standard and has become
the leading proponent of the business judgment rule.' Pursuant to this
standard, courts do not inquire into the reasonableness of a CC&R or
decision by the HOA board of directors, but instead apply the same mea-
sure used for evaluating corporate board decisions.' Rather than focus-
ing on the interests of the individual or the larger CID community, this
standard looks to any advantage afforded the board. Thus, not only are
personal interests subject to serious restriction, judicial validation of the
board's enforcement actions does not even depend upon a finding they
benefit the community as a whole.' "If the corporate directors' conduct
is authorized, a showing must be made of fraud, self-dealing or uncon-
scionable conduct to justify judicial review." ' Consequently, courts will
uphold restrictions unless they are "the result of fraud, dishonesty or in-
competence."'
In adopting the business judgment standard, the New York Court of
Appeals in Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.9 consid-
86. See Kress, supra note 28, at 863-69. Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apart-
ment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990), was the first New York Court of Appeals
decision to implement the business judgment rule. Id. at 863 n.138.
87. See Schiller, supra note 74, at 1149-50.
88. See generally Randolph C. Gwirtzman, Note, An Exception to the Levandusky
Business Judgment Rule: Owner and Shareholder Interests in Condominium and
Cooperative Board Decisions, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1021 (1993) (arguing the business
judgment rule is too restrictive for decisions involving lifestyle and the home because
they affect an owner's personal liberties; CID board decisions have a more significant
impact on the everyday life of homeowners than corporate decisions have on share-
holders, but the HOA's board remains unfettered in its authority as long as its ac-
tions are not done in bad faith).
89. Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 401 A.2d 280, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1979).
90. Id. (citing Sarner v. Sarner, 162 A.2d 117, 127 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960),
on subsequent appeal, 185 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1962) (resolving issue of counsel fees).
91. 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990); see Gwirtzman, supra note 88, at 1038 (discussing
the New York Court of Appeals' justification of judicial economy in deciding to adopt
the business judgment test as the standard in disputes between individual unit own-
ers and HOAs over enforcement of CC&Rs); see also Cannon Point N., Inc. v. Abeles,
612 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (approving the lower court's use of the
business judgment standard in refusing to review a restriction prohibiting installation
ered the competing concerns of the board to act with unfettered discre-
tion within the scope of its authority and of the homeowners to have
protection from abuse of this power when exercised at the expense of
their individual, or even collective, interests.' Although acknowledging
the potential for abuse inherent in the board's power to restrict many
rights normally incident to property ownership, the court also noted that
an individual voluntarily submits to the board's authority by choosing to
purchase a CID unit.' Because the board's function is to manage the
community for the benefit of residents, the balance of interests favors
deferential judicial review of the board's day-to-day assessment of the
proper discharge of its responsibilities.' In the court's view, the
business judgment rule, rather than the reasonableness standard, better
accommodated the multiplicity of interests involved and relieved the
courts of determining the prudence of management decisions, a job they
were ill-equipped to do.9' "[B]y definition the responsibility for business
judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual capa-
bilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that
responsibility."' Under this standard, the burden of proof falls to the
individual challenging a restriction to show the board breached its fidu-
ciary duty or otherwise acted improperly.
To its advantage, the business judgment standard preserves board
authority and deters lawsuits that the reasonableness standard might
otherwise permit or at least encourage." Concomitantly, the narrow
scope of judicial review obviously disadvantages the individual owner to
of washing machines and dryers in individual units; since the board expressed con-
cern for the detrimental effect on the building's plumbing, the decision was within
the scope of its authority and in good faith): Smulder v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 576
N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding the business judgment rule does not
prevent judicial review if the board acted in bad faith). But see generally Croton Riv-
er Club, Inc. v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass'n, 145 B.R. 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (applying the reasonableness standard to a board's decision to set an individual
member's share of the budget at a rate higher than other unit owners because the
business judgment rule did not apply when the board singled out one member for
disparate treatment), qffd, 162 BR. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part, modified in
part, 52 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
92. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1320-21. Apparently, no New York statutory authori-
ty addresses the appropriate standard.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1321.
95. Id. at 1321-23.
96. Id. at 1322 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)).
97. See Kress, supra note 28, at 865-66 (discussing the Levandusky court's compar-
ison of the similarities and differences between the reasonableness and business judg-
ment standards).
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the extent it permits infringement of rights and interests with little or no
recourse but to relocate.9
C. Combined Reasonableness/Business Judgment Standard
In yet another alternative, some courts have combined elements of the
reasonableness standard and business judgment rule when evaluating
CC&R enforcement actions. For example, in Papalexiou v. Tower West
Condominium,' the New Jersey court addressed whether the board
exceeded its authority in levying a special assessment against unit own-
ers due to an emergency situation."° First, the court determined that
the actions of an association board, like those of corporate directors,
must be reasonable.' It also concluded, however, that "[tihe refusal to
enforce arbitrary and capricious rules promulgated by governing boards
of condominiums is simply an application of the 'business judgment'
rule." " Consistent with the latter conclusion, the court allowed judicial
review only on a showing of fraud, self-dealing or unconscionable con-
duct." Since the decision resulted from much deliberation and the
board acted in good faith pursuant to its authority, further judicial con-
sideration was unnecessary."°
In Rywalt v. Writer Corp., ° the Colorado Court of Appeals utilized
language derived from the reasonableness standard in determining
whether the board's decision to build a tennis court behind the plaintiffs
property came within the scope of its general management authority."
The court ultimately applied the business judgment rule, however, refus-
ing to enjoin construction because the record contained no evidence of
arbitrary or capricious action: "Courts will not, at the instance of stock-
holders or otherwise, interfere with or regulate the conduct of the di-
98. See generally Gwirtzman, supra note 88 (noting that, although the business
judgment standard helps foreclose frivolous lawsuits by deferring to decisions made
by the board, it does so at the expense of protecting the interests of homeowners).
99. 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979).
100. Id. at 283-84.
101. Id. at 285.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 286.
104. Id. at 286-87.
105. 526 P.2d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
106. Id. at 317.
rectors in the reasonable and honest exercise of their judgment and du-
ties. 
0 7
D. All Review Standards Substantially Limit Individual Challenges
Regardless of their analytical perspective, all standards of review are,
for the most part, indulgent of the exercise of authority by HOAs and
their governing boards. The reasonableness standard, whether or not in
combination with the business judgment rule, may vary somewhat in its
formulation, but, in the majority of cases, it substantially burdens the
individual's ability to challenge a particular restriction. Either the stan-
dard itself weights the equation wholly in favor of enforceability or the
burden as to unreasonableness lies with the unit owner. In California, the
individual must overcome both judicial obstacles. Thus, courts are un-
likely to overturn a board decision except in extreme circumstances."°
The business judgment rule is even more limiting because HOA deci-
sions, regardless of their impact on daily life, are subject to judicial re-
view only upon a showing of wrongdoing by the board. As long as the
action is taken in good faith, the courts will. decline to consider the mat-
ter further."° Thus, where the business judgment rule prevails, the indi-
vidual is equally at the mercy of HOAs, if not more so, than where the
rule of reasonableness governs. In addition, since business "judgment"
includes both good and bad decision-making, unit owners have virtually
no legal alternative in the case of poor judgment despite the negative
consequences.
Compounding these judicial limitations, CC&Rs, as well as other asso-
ciation rules and regulations, are very difficult to modify. Usually, a
supermajority, about eighty percent, is needed to effect any change in
CID declarations and bylaws. Such levels of agreement are difficult to
achieve under the best of circumstances. Disharmony is as likely a result
as consensus when the subject of a proposed change involves highly
personal and emotionally charged matters such as pet ownership. The
absence of legal recourse or meaningful self-help alternatives calls for a
legislative cure, a homeowners' bill of rights to ensure that the individual
will be treated fairly."'
107. Id.
108. See Schiller, supra note 74, at 1133 (stating that although the reasonableness
standard does protect homeowners from arbitrary and capricious rules, it still de-
pends upon a judicial assessment of reasonableness and thus affords considerable
latitude to the courts without specific guidelines to HOAs for rule-making).
109. See Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L REV.,
647, 666 (1981) (comparing reasonableness review with the corporate analogy) [here-
inafter Note, Judicial Review].
110. Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should
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IV. IMPACT OF CC&RS AND HOA ENFORCEMENT
Individuals purchasing units in a CID acquire the property subject to
CC&Rs contained in the developer's declaration, which must be prepared
and recorded prior to any sale."' The developer thus has tremendous,
and disproportionate, impact on the eventual quality of lifestyle in the
development, with owners concomitantly losing control over many every-
day matters, such as maintenance of their units. The imbalance of power
relative to the interests at stake is manifest: the developer, whose prima-
ry concern is to maximize financial gain, makes the initial and sole deter-
mination of which restrictions and limitations on personal activities to in-
clude in the declaration. To the extent multiple restrictions make units
more salable to certain people, the -developer has an incentive to include
as many as the market will bear. At the same time, protection of individ-
ual interests has little economic value; hence, those who may desire a
less restrictive living situation can expect little accommodation."' Since
amendment or modification of the CC&Rs is difficult,"3 the original re-
strictions usually remain intact long after the developer has departed.
Once CC&Rs are in place, HOAs have the responsibility of enforcing
them. In that capacity, these organizations exert considerable influence
over the bundle of rights normally considered integral to home owner-
Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L REv. 345, 350 (1992) (suggesting that
when developers draft the constitutions of private residential governments, they
should include a bill of rights to ensure homeowners that they will not be divested
of certain liberties by a majority vote of the other homeowners).
111. Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development
and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE
FOREST L REV. 915, 917 (1976). Although the CC&Rs may include restrictions on use
of the property and behavior standards for owners and guests, the declaration must
contain certain provisions such as voting rights and expense liabilities of unit owners.
See Schiller, supra note 74, at 1136. For a list of typical use restrictions, see supra
note 23. See generally MCKENZIE, supra note 26 (discussing community associations).
112. Barton and Silverman argue the CID structure is undemocratic from the incep-
tion because developers have undue influence over the community by creating the
original declaration and CC&Rs and initially have greater voting power and therefore
control over possible changes. See Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, Common
Interest Communities: Private Government and the Public Interest Revisited, in
COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBuc INTEREST 31
(Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman eds., 1994).
113. In California, for purposes of altering the provisions contained in the declara-
tion, the developer has three votes for every unit owned, and each new buyer has
one vote until 7596 of the units are sold and control officially passes from the devel-
oper to the new owners. See id. at 135.
ship." 4 To effectuate their enforcement functions, HOAs may levy fines,
impose liens on property, and even foreclose on individual mortgages."5
More broadly, HOAs are generally accorded "the power to adopt and
amend bylaws and regulations, adopt budgets for revenues, collect as-
sessments, institute or defend litigation, make contracts, incur liabilities,
regulate the use of common elements, indemnify officers of the associa-
tion, and assign rights to future income""' as well as any other powers
held by similar entities or those proper and necessary to discharge their
authority."
7
Under the aegis of the declaration and CC&Rs, these HOAs operate as
powerful private "mini-governments." Like corporations, they have a
potentially infinite life span, enjoy full legal rights with limited respon-
sibility for the individuals who manage them, and fulfill a narrow private
purpose in protecting the property values of CIDs." HOAs may also as-
114. See generally Bowler & McKenzie, supra note 27 (discussing the expansive
power of homeowner associations). Traditionally, property ownership has afforded
nearly complete independence of both lifestyle and control over structural and other
aesthetic changes. Other than matters subject to code restrictions, owners need not
obtain permission when deciding to make alterations or other modifications to interi-
or or exterior elements. Thus, owners reasonably assume when purchasing an interest
in a CID they have bought their own home. In fact they "are buying their pro-rated
share of all the common elements." Miller, supra note 76, at IK Therefore, in con-
trast to the usual situation, CID unit owners usually must consult the board and get
express approval of such changes. Id. In addition, because the HOA is responsible for
maintenance of the development, it, not the owners, decides when and what repairs
and structural changes to make and how to finance them. See Barton & Silverman,
supra note 112, at 34.
115. See Barton & Silverman, supra note 112, at 135.
116. See Schiller, supra note 74, at 1137.
117. Id.; see UNi. CoNDmuNnm AcT § 3-102(a), 7 ULA. 421, 501-02 (1980) (listing
the powers of unit owners associations).
118. See COMMUNrrY ASS'N INST., PuBuc PoLICY MANUAL, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
MEMBERS' AND RESIDENTS BILL OF RIGHTS, 51 (1993-94) ("[T]he community association's
governance is close to the individual in terms of directly affecting daily life ... [and
the] community association [has] enormous power to affect the member or resi-
dent . . . ."); Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 111, at 918. As "mini-governments," "com-
munity associations often provide utility services, road maintenance, street and com-
mon area lighting, and refuse removal." Id.; see URBAN LAND INSTJCOMMUN1TY ASS'N
INST., MANAGING A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY ASS'N 3 (1974). The power of community
associations to levy is their most distinctive characteristic resembling a government
Id. Modern political science references to corporations as governments appear as
early as Arthur Bentley, who wrote in 1908 that "a corporation is a government
through and through." THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN 117-18 (J. M. Dent and Sons 1976).
119. See McKENZIE, supra note 26, at 122. "It is essential to remember that a
[homeowner association] is a business operation, but one without a profit motive." Id.
(citation omitted). In his text, McKenzie applies a five-part definition of private gov-
ernments to CIDs: (1) an authoritative allocation of principal functions-the CID arti-
cles of incorporation; (2) a symbolic system for the ratification of collective deci-
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sume responsibility for functions and services typically provided by mu-
nicipalities and other local governments.'2 ° Yet, because legal challenges
to their authority remain severely curtailed, HOAs may infringe upon the
unfettered enjoyment of one's property without justifying their actions or
even according individuals a modicum of due process. 2 '
The HOA exercises its power through a board of directors, a small
group of individuals selected from among the unit owners."n In this re-
spect, the organizational system of CIDs is consistent with the oligarchic
structure usually found in private governments." Given the wide range
of responsibilities falling to the board of directors, including financial,
legal, and maintenance decision-making, one might expect its members
to be highly skilled and/or well-educated. This is not the norm, however,
it is only fortuitous if members are thus qualified to serve on the board
of directors.' CC&Rs generally require no particular level or degree of
education or experience to serve.'25 In addition, some residents may be
reluctant to participate due to the heavy time commitment, numerous re-
sions--the annual election to select board members; (3) an operating system of com-
mand-the board and committee structure; (4) a system of rewards and punish-
ments-fines against members for violations; and (5) institutions for the enforcement
of the common rules--hearing procedures to enforce restrictions. See id. at 133.
120. These services include road maintenance, sewage treatments, street and com-
mon area lighting as well as other public safety features, refuse removal, and com-
mon area maintenance and gardening; they are funded through membership dues akin
to taxes. Id. Additionally, HOAs manage assets (sometimes totaling millions of dol-
lars), allocate funds, and enforce restrictions through the assessment of fines. This
phenomenon has been associated with the growing desire of Americans to have re-
sponsibility for their municipal and related local services assumed by private enter-
prise. Like local governments, HOAs may also exert control over extensive geograph-
ical areas, including many buildings and surrounding grounds. Gillette, supra note 23,
at 1382.
121. A somewhat startling example arose in Boca Raton, Florida, where an HOA
maintained a 30-pound weight limit for pets and required one resident to attend a
court supervised weigh-in for his dog, who tipped the scales at 29 1/2 pounds. See
Klein, supra note 19, at KI. In Santa Ana, California, an HOA cited a 51-year-old
woman for "kissing and doing bad things" while parked in the driveway of the com-
plex. See id.; David Wilman, Woman Faces Fine for Kissing Her Date, LA. TIMES,
June 16, 1991, at A3. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY
945-49 (3d ed. 1993) (providing a review of recent cases involving condominium
homeowners associations and citing the Willman article).
122. See generally McKENzE, supra note 26.
123. Id.
124. Karen E. Klein, How Homeowners Groups Run Series, LA. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1995, at K5 (pt. 3).
125. Id.
sponsibilities, and possibility of having to enforce restrictions against
neighbors and friends.'26 This hit-or-miss, uncredentialed caliber of
board membership tends to reduce its efficiency and create uncertainty
and arbitrariness regarding enforcement actions.'27
Moreover, enforcement procedures often fail to meet even a minimal
level of due process."n The board of directors passes the rules, prose-
cutes the alleged violators, and adjudges "guilt." "29 The individual owner
can hardly rely on the HOA to evaluate its own rules and enforcement
action in a neutral manner. Unit owners may not be given notice of a
proposed board action or a fair opportunity to be heard."° Board meet-
ings, where directors discuss the imposition of additional rules and regu-
lations directly affecting owners' uses of their property, are often
closed.'3' These actions generally are not subject to neutral review ei-
ther for reasonableness or fairness unless the individual has the time and
money to instigate litigation.
Those residing in CIDs either affirmatively choose to live there be-
cause of perceived benefits or decide to do so primarily because of fi-
nancial constraints. According to the choice theory, owners in the first
category are attracted to CIDs by the wide variety of amenities and ser-
vices offered.' In exchange, they agree to relinquish certain rights nor-
mally associated with property ownership and accept transference of
126. Id.
127. See Bowler & McKenzie, supra note 27, at 56-57.
128. See generally Barton & Silverman, supra note 112 (discussing common interest
communities and its undemocratic structure).
129. Id.
130. See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 111, at 924-925. Clearly, local government
would be unable to effectuate any action against an individual in the absence of
notice and hearing.
131. The importance of open meetings is recognized in California Assembly Bill No.
46, introduced by Assembly Member Hauser on December 12, 1994, which would
.reorganize and expand the scope of the law relating to association board of direc-
tors meetings, by creating the 'Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act.'"
A.B. 46, Cal. 1994-95 Reg. Sess. Even when meetings are open to the general mem-
bership, many declarations allow HOAS to meet with a quorum of as few as 10% of
the residents present. See Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 111, at 924. This minimal num-
ber contrasts sharply with the high percentage needed to modify or repeal a re-
striction. Id.
By comparison, "sunshine laws" in many states and localities ensure public ac-
cess to most governmental meetings at which business similar to that of a homeown-
ers association would be conducted. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950 (West 1983) (The
Brown Act); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974).
132. See generally Kress, supra note 28; Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman,
The Political Life of Mandatory Homeowners' Associations, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNI-
TY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 31
(Advisory Comm'n Intergovernmental Relations, 1989).
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governmental functions to the private sector. Since they desire the bene-
fits provided, for these individuals the advantages tip the scale in favor
of CID living even though they necessarily become subject to the restric-
tions imposed by the CC&Rs and the enforcement authority of the HOA.
This "choice" is sometimes illusory, however. The model assumes con-
sumers are sufficiently knowledgeable about their alternatives to make
informed decisions. Yet, studies show sales personnel are often ill-in-
formed and many buyers remain ignorant of the full extent to which
their activities may be curtailed. Most of the language in the governing
documents is boilerplate and not subject to negotiation or
amendment."
Others opt for CIDs because they are unable to find housing alterna-
tives within their price range.' In states like California, more than half
of all new non-rental housing units are located in CIDs. Thus CIDs may
be the only economically viable option for owning residential property.
The dramatic increase of such developments has resulted in a semi-mo-
nopoly of housing within certain price ranges."n For many people who
buy a house in spite of, rather than because of, HOA control, the addi-
tional amenities and services that CIDs offer may not be particularly at-
tractive, especially if the result is higher association fees. The only bene-
fit is the opportunity for affordable property ownership. As with those in
the "choice" category, these individuals likewise have no ability to miti-
gate the constraints on their personal lifestyle imposed by the CC&Rs
and HOA enforcement actions.
The CID governing structure deprives owners of a substantial measure
of independence traditionally associated with home ownership not only
because it controls so many details of daily life, but also because it re-
mains inflexible and essentially immutable. This circumstance has
prompted legal scholars, commentators, and members of the public to
suggest the need for some curative action, possibly in the drafting of
more generalized CC&Rs or provision of a review mechanism to deter-
mine if restrictions continue to serve their intended purpose."n Current-
133. Dowden, supra note 20, at 27.
134. In general, condominium units are less expensive than single-family homes and
allow home ownership with a lower down payment and lower monthly payments. See
Schiller, supru note 74, at 1133.
135. Partly for this reason, it has been argued CIDs tend to increase segregation
according to economic status. See generaily Barton & Silverman, supra note 112
(discussing the undemocratic nature of CIDs).
136. See id. See generally French, supra note 110 (advocating the need for a home-
ly, although an owner may theoretically challenge the HOA in a lawsuit,
the disparity in the parties' relative financial resources and legal posi-
tions renders this alternative unavailing in all but the most egregious
cases. In some jurisdictions, including California, nonbinding arbitration
is available to resolve minor disputes;37 it is unclear, however, whether
HOAs are required to participate. In any event, arbitration will not solve
the problem." The larger concerns at issue are whether HOAs wield
disproportionate power and whether their enforcement of CC&Rs is
subject to sufficient independent scrutiny. In my view, the solution lies in
legislation promulgating a bill of rights to protect the interests of individ-
ual CID unit owners from the undeniable lack of accountability wit-
nessed today.
V. PROPOSED MODEL LEGISLATION
Common interest developments are the fastest growing form of hous-
ing in the United States, in part due to the rise in housing costs relative
to income."n The mandatory HOAs managing and controlling CIDs oper-
ate, in many instances, like city councils, collecting assessments, provid-
ing public services, enforcing CC&Rs and bylaws through fines and liens
on unit property.' ° Because these associations are not governments,
owners bill of rights). The Community Associations Institute has even acknowledged
the need for a homeowners bill of rights and established one in its Public Policy
Manual for 1993-94. See supra note 118. The language of this document is vague,
however, and it does not give any meaningful rights or redress to unit owners or
residents.
137. FLA STAT. ANN. § 718.1255 (West Supp. 1995); see McKENZIE, supra note 26, at
132 (describing the range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures available
in various states). In California, § 1354(b) of the Civil Code provides for optional
binding or nonbinding ADR when a claim for monetary relief does not exceed $5,000.
CAL. Cv. CODE § 1354(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). In Florida, nonbinding arbitra-
tion is a prerequisite to the filing of a lawsuit by either party. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.1255(4)(a) (West Supp. 1995). For a more detailed explanation of how this pro-
cess works, see Kress supra note 28, at 883.
138. Arbitration is frequently ineffectual for one of two reasons: either it is
nonbinding or it is mandatory only in cases of minor disputes. Owners with serious
problems are left to the legal system, which may be hostile as well as expensive.
139. BARTON & SILVERMAN, sup'ra note 19, at 8 (noting that in some metropolitan
areas, such as San Jose and San Diego, the majority of new housing units are CIDs);
McKENZIE, supra note 26, at 11. As of 1992, there were 150,000 HOAs. Id. California
has approximately 25,000, second to Florida with 40,000. Id.
140. Evan McKenzie, Welcome Home, Do as We Say, N.Y. TimES, Aug. 18, 1994, at
A15; see Nellie S. Huang, Ten Things Your Homeowners Association Won't Tell You,
SMART MONEY, Dec. 1994, at 87. Huang's article relates the experience of a homeown-
er who lost his home to the bank when his HOA placed a lien on his property. Id.
The HOA had fined him every month for violating the association's architectural de-
sign rules by planting too many roses in his yard and "degrading" the site. Id. He
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their actions are subject to scant judicial review and do not have to meet
any constitutional standards of reasonableness or fairness.' Neither
equal protection nor due process guarantees apply to the CC&Rs govern-
ing CID owners or the proceedings by which HOAs enforce them.'42 As
CIDs increase in popularity, so too does the need for some type of check
on the power of HOAs to restrict individual interests."
The legislature is the most logical institution to provide this necessary
restraint and protection. Although some states have already enacted
statutory schemes governing some of the issues related to CIDs, they fo-
cus principally on interpretation of CC&Rs and do not address the ques-
tion of specifically enumerated individual rights.'4 California is one
such example: Civil Code section 1354 (a) concerns only enforceability of
also had to pay the association's $70,000 legal bill. Id.
141. See Schiller, supra note 74, at 1147.
142. Note, Judicial Review, supra note 109, at 657. "There are many significant
questions about the constitutionality of the 'private governments'.... If they are
based, as most of them are, on the [homeowner] association concept, serious legal is-
sues arise in terms of equal enfranchisement of all citizens, since most HOAs exclude
lessees from membership. Thus these 'private governments' may violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" MCKENZIE, supra note 26, at 136
(citation omitted).
143. Note, Judicial Review, supra note 109, at 652 (noting that legislatures have
left government responsibilities for condominiums to the developers and HOAs).
144. Schiller, supra note 74, at 1138. Only a few states have statutes that establish
standards for reviewing all types of CID rules and regulations; however, the standards
are usually nebulous. For example, in Alabama the relevant statute states: "[T]he
association may adopt, distribute, amend and enforce reasonable rules governing the
administration and management of the condominium property and the use of the
common and limited common elements." ALA. CODE § 35-8-9(3) (1991). This language
raises the same problems generally associated with reasonableness review because it
fails to make any exception for personal lifestyle activities and thus does not ade-
quately protect the interests of individual homeowners. Some states have statutory au-
thority requiring CC&Rs in the CID's declaration be reasonable, but these mandates
do not necessarily apply to bylaws and amendments by HOAs; thus, the standard for
their enforceability may remain uncertain. For example, in Nevada "the owner of a
project may, prior to the conveyance of any condominium therein, record a declara-
tion of restrictions relating to such project, which restrictions shall be enforceable
equitable servitudes where reasonable." NEv. REv. STAT. § 117.060 (1986). Maryland
has statutory authority requiring HOAs to follow certain procedural requirements
when enacting regulations amending the declaration or bylaws. The requirements in-
dude giving at least 10 days' notice to unit owners stating the nature of the pro-
posed regulation. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 11-111 (1988). Under the Uniform
Condominium Act, HOAs can "adopt and amend bylaws and rules and regulations,"
but the Act does not articulate the standard by which enforceability should be deter-
mined. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
CC&Rs as equitable servitudes "unless unreasonable."'" This broad pro-
vision allows for a potentially infinite variety of restrictions to be put in
place even before the first owner takes up residence in a CID. Subse-
quently enacted bylaws are probably governed by this standard as well.
Given the very real possibility of encroachment into areas of personal
lifestyle, this language requires some tempering to ensure certain individ-
ual interests are preserved from majoritarian control.
Several legal scholars have echoed the call for a standard of review
more solicitous of personal freedoms than the rule of reasonableness
presently applied by the courts. Evan McKenzie, an advocate of
homeowners' rights, points out in his book, Privatopia, Homeowner As-
sociations and the Rise of Residential Private Government," that the
CID movement, especially the Community Associations Institute,'47 sig-
nificantly influenced the drafting of current legislation, including the
Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act." As a result, the
businesses that serve HOAs and their lobbyists have shaped the law to
the disadvantage of individual homeowners. "' In McKenzie's view, Con-
gress should take action to rectify this imbalance.
McKenzie originally criticized the standard of enforceability codified in
section 1354 of the California Civil Code as too vague because it gave no
guidelines for determining reasonableness, thus inviting litigation as resi-
dents challenged restrictions they claimed infringed on their private
lives.' ° Following the Nahrstedt decision, the standard is no longer
vague: CC&Rs are presumptively valid, and the homeowner bears the
burden of proving a restriction unreasonable on its face.'"' In exchange
for a clear standard that favors enforceability, the individual loses all
145. CAL CIrV. CODE § 1354(a) (West Supp. 1995).
146. See supra note 26.
147. The Community Associations Institute (CA) is a "national, nonprofit association
created in 1973 to educate and represent America's residential community association
(CA) industry." COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE SPRING CATALOG 4 (1995).
148. See MCKENZIE, supra note 26, at 163. McKenzie explains that CID association
forces have been successful in resisting judicial and legislative action that would treat
HOAs as governmental entities and in reducing the potential liability of board mem-
bers in lawsuits filed by homeowners, developers, and others. Id. He also describes
how the legislative task force that produced the Davis-Stirling Act was composed
mainly of legal advocates for CIDs, with no other interest groups having as much
influence over the drafting of the legislation. Id.
149. Klein, supra note 124, at K6. Klein describes how HOAs, operating essentially
as large-scale businesses, must employ an array of professionals, including attorneys,
bankers, property managers, accountants, and landscapers, to aid them in running
their communities. Id. Indicative of their power, these HOAs control large amounts of
revenue, with approximately $28 billion in reserve funds nationwide. Id.
150. MCKENZIE, supra note 26, at 169; see Huang, supra note 140, at 88 (noting that
in California, 75% of HOAs are involved in some type of litigation).
151. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1286.
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ability to challenge a particular application as unreasonable under given
circumstances. 2 If McKenzie saw the need for legislative intervention
before Nahrstedt, its judicial imprimatur on virtually all CC&R enforce-
ment actions now sounds the clarion call.
Linda French has also advocated a homeowner bill of rights in her
article, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should
Include a Bill of Rights."n She emphasizes that in creating the original
declaration, a developer's first priority is to sell the property profitably
with only secondary consideration to the interests of individual home-
owners." The current trend in these declarations is to accord the HOA
substantial authority over not only the common areas, but also individual
units.1" This practice has generated well-grounded fears that homeown-
ers will lose control over their lifestyles. French proposes a bill of rights
in the declaration to guarantee homeowners that neither the HOA nor a
majority of other owners will be allowed to pass regulations infringing
personal liberties in this manner."
Complementing my criticism of the majority's application of Civil Code
section 1354 in Nahrstedt, I am now proposing model language that will
address the serious and legitimate concerns that HOA enforcement of
CC&Rs has occasioned.
157
152. Id. at 1288.
153. See generaUy French, supra note 110 (advocating a homeowner bill of rights).
154. See id. at 347.
155. Id
156. Id. at 351 (proposing that the bill of rights should include provisions specifical-
ly addressing equal treatment, speech, religious and holiday displays, household com-
position, activities within individually owned property, pets, alienation, and allocation
of burdens and benefits).
157. This language derives from similar legislation now pending in the Maryland
General Assembly. See H.B., 651, 1995 Md. Leg. Sess.
SENATE/ASSEMBLY BILL
Introduced by
January 1, 1996
An act to add Section 1354.5 to the Davis-Stirling Act, relating to com-
mon interest developments.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
Under existing law, the covenants and restrictions in the declaration of
a common interest development shall be enforceable equitable
servitudes, unless unreasonable.
This is an act concerning Condominium and Homeowners Association
restrictions for the purpose of prohibiting certain provisions in the re-
corded covenants and restrictions, declarations, bylaws, and rules of
certain condominiums or homeowners associations that restrict the use
or maintenance of units or common elements without certain justifica-
tion or in a manner that denies certain civil rights, and generally relating
to the recorded covenants and restrictions, declarations, bylaws, and
rules of condominiums, and homeowners associations.
This bill would include rules and regulations passed by associations
that are not in the common interest development's declaration. These
rules cannot restrict activities in one unit or in the common areas if they
deny a civil right guaranteed by the Federal or State Constitution or by
any federal, state, county or local statute, ordinance or regulation.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
1 SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE STATE OF
2 CALIFORNIA, that the Laws of California read as follows:
3 ARTICLE - REAL PROPERTY
4 A recorded covenant, condition or restriction, a provision in a
5 declaration, or a provision of the bylaws or rules of a common
6 interest development may not restrict the use or maintenance of a
7 unit or the common elements:
No. * *
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8 (1) Without reasonable justification, based on economic,
9 aesthetic, health, or safety considerations; or
10 (2) In a manner that denies a civil right granted or
guaranteed
11 under the United States Constitution, the California Constitution, or
12 a federal, state, county, or local statute, ordinance or regulation.
If similar legislation had been enacted when Natore Nahrstedt moved
into Lakeside Village with her three cats, her battle with the Association
would most likely have taken a different turn." The proviso that
CC&Rs and bylaws "may not restrict the use or maintenance of a condo-
minium unit... without reasonable justification" places the burden on
the HOA to demonstrate reasonableness based on economic, aesthetic,
health or safety considerations. Moreover, even if the HOA can defend a
restriction as reasonable in the abstract, this legislation does not prevent
the unit owner from challenging it based on individual circumstances.
Since Nahrstedt's cats created no nuisance, did not threaten the quiet
enjoyment of other residents, and did not otherwise impair community
interests of Lakeside Village, the Association could not have justified
their exclusion as reasonable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The burgeoning popularity of common interest developments in recent
decades has placed personal freedoms and lifestyle interests on the en-
dangered species list. Because the developer, who has only an economic
motivation, controls the content of the declaration and the specifics in
the CC&Rs, both those who are attracted to CIDs for their amenities and
those who purchase for financial reasons are extremely limited in their
capacity to negotiate changes or otherwise alter burdensome restrictions.
The threat to individual interests arises first from the relatively lenient
standards for determining the validity of CC&Rs and second from the
virtually unrestrained power of HOAs to enforce compliance. While
HOAs function like self-contained governments, they remain largely unac-
countable for the manner in which they discharge their authority.
158. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal
1994) (en banc).
In the Nahrstedt decision, the California Supreme Court divined a
legislative intent to elevate uniformity of application over consideration
of whether the owner's "transgression" actually impaired the viability of
community life." By rejecting an "as applied" standard, the court not
only tipped the scales in favor of stability and predictability of enforce-
able common interests, it created a major imbalance between those inter-
ests and the personal freedoms considered an integral part of residential
property ownership." The court in Nahrstedt thus enhanced and aug-
mented the substantial power HOAs already enjoy with no countervailing
check on the exercise of that power.
The model legislation I propose is intended to address these concerns
by establishing some semblance of balance between community and
individual interests. While the stability of CIDs both in terms of quiet
enjoyment and economic investment remains an important and worthy
consideration, it should not come at the expense of the personal free-
doms Americans traditionally expect to enjoy in their own homes.'' If
enacted into law, such legislation will provide a minimal level of protec-
tion for those expectations and ensure an adequate measure of consider-
ation for lifestyle choices.
Balkanization of owners and tenants is a risk now reasonably foreseen
under empowered bureaucratic regimes that suffocate liberty, moving
dynamically from tranquility to threat to compulsion. As custodians of
tradition entering the millennium, our duty in avoidance is to encourage
instead a hymn to harmony and a paean to peaceful coexistence.
159. Id. at 1288.
160. Id.
161. "For a man's house is his castle, and one's home is the safest refuge to every-
one." SIR EDWARD T. COKE, 3 INsTruTEs OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 161 (William S.
Hein & Co. ed., 1986) (Latin omitted) (old English paraphrased).
